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INSTASEARCH:
FIXING FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AS APPLIED TO
INSTAGRAM AND OTHER CYBERSPACE DATA STORAGE
PROVIDERS
Adam Charles Maas*
Under the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the
constitutional privacy protections that many Americans take for
granted are non-existent in cyberspace because of the third-party
doctrine, which was born decades before the popular adoption of
cyberspace social networks and data storage services. When
someone in America posts a picture on Instagram or updates a
status on Facebook, regardless of the enabled privacy settings, the
Supreme Court has determined that the Fourth Amendment does
not protect that information from unreasonable search or seizure.
However, Americans do in fact have reasonable expectations of
privacy when using cyberspace services like Instagram, Facebook,
Google Drive, and Dropbox. Therefore, the courts should adopt a
new test for discerning reasonable expectations of privacy that
better balances the public interest in effective law enforcement
with the actual reasonable privacy expectations of individuals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Instagram is one of the largest social networks in the world,
and it is growing quickly. 2 As of December 2014, 300 million
1
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people actively used the service daily, which is 100 million more than
did so less than one year prior.3 Instagram’s owner, Facebook,4 has
grown over ten years from a small social network that Mark
Zuckerberg operated out of his dorm room to a global phenomenon
with over one billion users.5 As a result of the increased usage—by
both law-abiding citizens and criminals—of these and other
Internet services that store massive amounts of user data, 6 law
enforcement has increasingly sought access to this user-generated
information to facilitate criminal investigations. United States v.
Gatson7 provides a good example.
In Gatson, police officers created a fake Instagram account
through which they requested8 that Daniel Gatson—a suspect in a
burglary investigation—grant them access to his pictures.9 Gatson
complied without knowing that police operated the account. Some
of the pictures featured Gatson with cash and jewelry that police

1

Instagram is a social networking site that allows users to share pictures. For
more information, see INSTAGRAM, http://www.instagram.com (last visited Jan.
9, 2015).
2
Alice Truong, How Instagram Overtook Twitter in Users – In One Chart,
QUARTZ (Dec. 10, 2014), http://qz.com/309908/how-instagram-overtook-twitterin-users-in-one-chart/.
3
Id.
4
Facebook bought Instagram in 2012. Kashmir Hill, 10 Reasons Why Facebook
Bought Instagram, FORBES (April 11, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/kashmirhill/2012/04/11/ten-reasons-why-facebook-bought-instagram/.
5
Jemima Kiss, Facebook’s 10th Birthday: From College Dorm to 1.23 Billion
Users, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2014/feb/04/facebook-10-years-mark-zuckerberg.
6
Facebook alone has been reported to process over 500TB of data every day.
Donna Tam, Facebook Processes More Than 500 TB of Data Daily, CNET
(Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-processes-more-than-500tb-of-data-daily/.
7
No. 13-705, 2014 WL 7182275 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2014).
8
Instagram users have the option either to allow any other users to view their
photographs at all times or to require each user that wishes to view their
photographs be specifically granted permission by them. See How Do I Set My
Photos and Videos to Private So That Only Approved Followers Can See Them?,
INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com/448523408565555 (last visited Jan. 10,
2015).
9
See Gatson, 2014 WL 7182275, at *22.
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believed had been stolen in a string of burglaries.10 The police did
not have a warrant to create a false account and use it to gain
access to Gatson’s data, but the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey nonetheless allowed the evidence because it
found that Gatson had consented11 to the search when he accepted
the police account’s request to view his photos.12
As more of daily American life takes place on social media
services like Instagram and Facebook and more data is stored online
with services like Dropbox and Google Drive, the intersections
between those services and criminal investigations will become
more frequent and significant.13 This Recent Development examines
the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and government
searches of data stored on these sites. The third-party doctrine is
essential in cyberspace because some warrantless searches are
necessary to facilitate successful law enforcement in that arena, but
modifications are needed with respect to specific cyberspace
platforms. This balancing would protect the reasonable privacy
expectations of users while not unduly infringing upon effective
law enforcement practices.
For services whose primary function is the sharing of data, a
search should require a warrant if the search technique would
constitute a breach of a website’s Terms of Service (“TOS”). Such
a search should require a warrant because a reasonable person
would expect privacy in information obtainable only by breaking

10

Id.
The consent of the defendant will allow the warrant requirement to be
waived. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 218 (“It is equally
well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the
requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted
pursuant to consent.”).
12
Gatson, 2014 WL 7182275, at *22.
13
Dropbox is a cloud storage service that allows users to upload their files and
then access them from any internet-enabled device. For more information about
Dropbox, see DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
Google Drive is a cloud storage service that allows users to upload their files
and then access them from any internet-enabled device. For more information
about Google Drive, see Google Drive, WEBOPEDIA, http://www.webopedia.com/
TERM/G/google_drive.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
11
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the law or by violating established community norms.14 In the case
of services whose primary function is data storage, courts should
maintain the third-party doctrine but create an evidentiary privilege
between users and the service with a specific exception for evidence
of criminal activity discovered through prescribed means.15
Part II discusses the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
and the third-party doctrine in the face of technological advancement.
Part III explains both the weaknesses of the third-party doctrine
and why, despite those weaknesses, the doctrine should not be
discarded entirely. Part IV suggests a solution in order to reconcile
the legitimate privacy concerns of citizens in cyberspace with the
need for effective law enforcement in a world with technology well
beyond the imaginations of the drafters of the Fourth Amendment.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW AND CYBERSPACE
Courts developed the third-party doctrine before the creation of
the Internet. The doctrine was necessary to preserve the police
practice of using informants or undercover agents to investigate
suspects prior to having the probable cause necessary to justify a
search or arrest warrant because informants and covert police officers
are third parties to the information they observe.16 Currently, the
doctrine exempts any data stored in cyberspace from Fourth
Amendment protection.17 However, the Supreme Court has indicated
in recent decisions in Riley v. California 18 and United States v.
14
For more information regarding the possibility that breaking a website’s
Terms of Service agreement might be illegal see Kerr, infra note 107 and
accompanying text.
15
See infra Part IV.A. (describing in detail these authorized means).
16
See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 756 (1952) (“Society can ill
afford to throw away the evidence produced by the falling out, jealousies, and
quarrels of those who live by outwitting the law. Certainly no one would
foreclose the turning of state’s evidence by denizens of the underworld. No good
reason of public policy occurs to us why the Government should be deprived of
the benefit of On Lee’s admissions because he made them to a confidante of
shady character.”).
17
The reader should remember that even though the Constitution does not
provide protection, Congress could draft laws to do so. For information about
such laws, see infra note 58 and accompanying text.
18
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
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Jones 19 that there may be some changes brewing in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence with respect to cyberspace.
A. Origins of the Third-Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine refers to the Supreme Court’s
determination that people do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in information that they disclose to others.20 The doctrine
originated with the Supreme Court’s decision in On Lee v. United
States.21 In that case, the defendant was an opium dealer operating
under the cover of his laundry business, and he made incriminating
statements to a person who he believed was his friend.22 Unfortunately
for Lee, his friend had become a police informant and was wearing
a wire.23 The police did not obtain a warrant before sending in the
informant to talk with Lee.24 At trial, Lee made the argument that
the fact that the wire was attached to a person as opposed to an
object in his laundry did not mean that the government had not
conducted an unwarranted search of his business when it sent the
informant onto his private property.25 The Court disagreed and ruled
that because the person wearing the wire was a participant in the
conversation with whom the defendant had voluntarily shared
information, with or without the wire, no search subject to Fourth
Amendment protection had occurred. 26 The Court also reasoned
that the informant could have heard the same conversation had he
been eavesdropping outside the window, which at the time was not
considered a search because it was not a physical trespass.27
19

132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477,
528-29 (2006) (providing a general description of the third-party doctrine).
21
343 U.S. 747, 756 (1952); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 567 (2009) (beginning the
discussion of the history of the third-party doctrine with On Lee).
22
On Lee, 343 U.S. at 749.
23
Id.
24
See id. at 751.
25
See id. at 751–52 (rejecting defendant’s argument that stated a trespass had
occurred and therefore there was an illegal search).
26
See id. at 754 (rejecting the argument that eavesdropping on a conversation
with the “connivance of one of the parties” constitutes an unreasonable search).
27
Id.
20
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The Court discarded the strict trespass standard in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence—whereby a physical trespass was a
necessary condition for a search—in Katz v. United States. 28
Instead the Court declared “the Fourth Amendment protects people”
and not “simply areas.” 29 A now-famous concurrence written by
Justice Harlan set up the modern test to determine if a search
protected by the Fourth Amendment has occurred.30 The first prong
of the test requires that a person have a subjective expectation of
privacy, and the second prong requires the expectation to be one
that “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”31 The Katz
test would have allowed future courts to determine that a person
who shares information with a bank, a friend, or any other third
party has a reasonable expectation—under certain circumstances
defined by the Court—that the information will remain private as
to everyone else other than that third party.32 However, the Court
rejected the extension of reasonable expectations of privacy to
third parties in United States v. White33 and held categorically that
people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information divulged to a third person.34 The Court later extended
the third-party doctrine to businesses, such as banks and phone
companies, which hold client information.35
28

389 U.S. 347 (1967). Although Katz removed physical trespass as a
necessary condition of Fourth Amendment searches, the Supreme Court in Jones
revived the idea that physical trespass can be a sufficient condition for a search.
According to the Jones majority, Katz augmented the trespass doctrine by
removing the “strictness” of the test rather than abandoning the test entirely as
some had believed. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
29
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
30
See Kerr, supra note 21, at 568.
31
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
32
Importantly, this may have foreclosed the use of undercover informants
because if the court ruled that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy
with respect to outsiders in conversations held in private, many undercover
informants would be prevented from sharing information gained from such
conversations at a trial.
33
401 U.S. 745 (1971).
34
Id. at 749.
35
See generally Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (finding that
records held by a defendant’s accountant were not subject to a reasonable
expectation of privacy and therefore not protected by the Fourth Amendment);
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For Fourth Amendment purposes, Instagram is like a phone
company or a bank. When a user posts a picture on his Instagram
account, other users are able to view it on Instagram, and the
employees of Instagram can also see it even if the account is
entirely private as to other users. 36 Therefore, the poster has
disclosed the photo to a third party in the same way that he would
disclose dialed phone numbers to a phone company or account
numbers to a bank. Consequently, the Internet seemingly offers users
no protection from warrantless searches because most information
uploaded in cyberspace is accessible by the operators of whichever
platform is used to store the data.37 There are, however, reasons to
believe that the Supreme Court is on the verge of making some
changes to its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and might even be
ready to abandon the third-party doctrine altogether.38
B. Wavering on the Third-Party Doctrine in Riley v. California
and United States v. Jones
Recent Supreme Court opinions in Riley v. California 39 and
United States v. Jones 40 have created doubt that the third-party
see also United States v Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (finding bank account
records to be unprotected by the Fourth Amendment); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979) (finding that data—recorded by pen registers—held by phone
companies regarding the numbers dialed from a particular phone was not subject
to Fourth Amendment protection).
36
See Privacy Policy, INSTAGRAM, https://instagram.com/about/legal/privacy/
#section1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) (explaining that Instagram collects and
monitors data posted by users to the service).
37
For an exception to this rule, see infra note 104 and accompanying text
describing services that do not observe or hold user data.
38
For more information on the abandonment of the third-party doctrine with
respect to data stored in cyberspace (such as Instagram photos), see Ryan Watzel,
Riley’s Implications for Fourth Amendment Protection in the Cloud, 124 YALE
L.J. F. 73 (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/rileys-implicationsin-the-cloud (“Riley suggests that the Court is ready to find that cloud-based data
receive Fourth Amendment protection, and that cloud users do not waive a
reasonable expectation of privacy in every file they save simply because storage
is moving to the cloud.”). But see Kerr, supra note 21 (arguing that the third
party doctrine should be kept because it is simple and predictable in its
application as well as being necessary to find modern crime).
39
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).

16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 202, 209
InstaSearch
doctrine will continue to operate as it has in the past, especially
where cyberspace data is concerned. In Jones, the police suspected
that the defendant was trafficking in narcotics and installed,
without a warrant, 41 a very small GPS tracking device on his car
while it was parked in a public parking lot.42 Police then observed
and recorded the movements of the defendant’s vehicle for four
weeks using the GPS tracker they had installed on the car. 43 In
response to a pretrial motion, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia ruled that the police did not need a
warrant to place the GPS tracker on the car and monitor its travels
because no search had occurred excepting the period when the car
was parked inside of a garage. 44 The Supreme Court previously
held that a “person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another,” and the District Court
accordingly supported its decision with that reasoning.45 The majority
opinion in Jones did not reach the issue of reasonable privacy
expectations, 46 but in a concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor
raised questions regarding the reasonableness of the third-party
doctrine in the modern world writing that:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal
a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in
the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the
40

132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
The police had obtained a warrant to use the device in the District of
Columbia for ten days, but they installed the device on the eleventh day while
the car was parked in Maryland. Id. at 948.
42
Id. at 948.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)).
46
The majority in Jones avoided the third-party issue by finding in favor of
the defendant because the placing of the tracking device on the defendant’s car
was a trespass and therefore required a warrant. Jones, 132 U.S. at 950 (“[F]or
most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a
particular concern for government trespass upon the areas it enumerates. Katz
did not repudiate that understanding.”).
41
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phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers;
the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which
they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the
books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online
retailers. I for one doubt that people would accept without
complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a
list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or
month, or year. But whatever the societal expectations, they
can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a
prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the
public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone,
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.47

Although the majority in Jones did not rule on the basis of
reasonable privacy expectations, neither did it dismiss the idea that
a persistent four-week-long observation of an automobile driving
around could violate the driver’s reasonable expectations of privacy.48
However, under the third-party doctrine, the Court should hold that
any driving activity observable by others in public has been
willfully disclosed to third parties and is therefore not subject to a
reasonable privacy expectation.49
In Riley, the police stopped the defendant for a traffic violation
and arrested him on weapons charges after conducting an
inventory search of his impounded car.50 After the arrest, the police
47

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
48
Id. at 954 (“It may be that achieving the same result through electronic
means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question.”).
49
The flaw in this reasoning is that unlike government surveillance, no one
person on the street would observe every movement of a car for days or weeks
at a time. Additionally, the people in public—who individually may have
observed a particular car for only a few seconds—would never spontaneously
gather together for the purpose of compiling an account of any one car’s travels
over a long period of time. Therefore, it is often reasonable for someone driving
in public to expect that his journey in aggregate will remain private.
50
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). An inventory search is a
search done for the purpose of collecting and securing property in a car that has
been seized. It is not an investigative search, but the Court has ruled generally
that evidence of a crime found during such a search does not require probable
cause or a warrant to be used at trial. See e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
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conducted a warrantless search of his person incident to the arrest
and discovered a smartphone.51 The police searched the smartphone
and found incriminating photographic evidence tying Riley to a
shooting that had occurred a few weeks prior.52 The Supreme Court
ruled that police must obtain a warrant under these circumstances
to search a phone incident to an arrest.53
Considering how many people now use smartphones in their
daily lives, Riley is an important decision. 54 The Court reasoned
that if all of the information that could be stored in a mobile phone
would receive robust privacy protections if it were stored in the
home—where it would have been stored prior to the invention of
smartphones—the Fourth Amendment protections should not be
reduced simply because that information is now located all in one
place on a smartphone.55 If anything, that fact supports providing
more privacy protection because the information accessible
through a smartphone is greater than that which any person can
store in one place in hard copy, and it is “qualitatively different”
from information typically stored in hard copy. 56 A search of a
U.S. 364 (1976) (“The decisions of [the Supreme Court of the United States]
point unmistakably to the conclusion reached by both federal and state courts
that inventories pursuant to standard police procedures are reasonable.”).
51
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480.
52
Id. at 2481.
53
Id. at 2495.
54
Around 160 million Americans own a smartphone. Smartphone Penetration
Now at Two-Thirds of the US Mobile Market, MARKETINGCHARTS (Mar. 10, 2014),
http://www.marketingcharts.com/online/smartphone-penetration-now-at-two-thirdsof-the-us-mobile-market-41248/; see also Ben Dickinson, How the Internet,
Social Media, and Smartphones Are Dividing And Conquering Our Consciousness,
ELLE (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.elle.com/life-love/society-career/social-mediasmartphones-influence-on-our-lives (describing the effects of pervasive use,
particularly among young people, of modern technology and noting particularly
that “[n]early 20 percent of smartphone owners ages 18 to 34 report having used
their phones while having sex”).
55
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495 (“The fact that technology now allows an
individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information
any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.”).
56
Id. at 2490 (“Although the data stored on a cell phone is distinguished from
physical records by quantity alone, certain types of data are also qualitatively
different. An internet search and browsing history, for example, can be found on
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person’s phone can reveal his tastes, interests, medical problems,
travel habits, and a host of other personal information that before
would never have been found in one place in a person’s house or
especially on his person.
The questions raised, both explicitly and implicitly, by the
Court’s analysis in Riley have implications for cyberspace data
storage beyond mobile phones, which are only one method of
accessing cyberspace. If accessing a suspect’s phone without a
warrant and thereby exposing much of his private life to
government scrutiny is a grave violation of the Fourth Amendment,
then going directly to the holders of the information accessible
through the mobile phone—such as e-mail services or cloud
storage providers—is as well. Concurring in Riley, Justice Alito
recognized that the Fourth Amendment raised these issues, but
rather than suggesting a re-assessment of the manner in which the
Katz test had been applied to cyberspace, Justice Alito preferred
that the issue be left to the legislature.57
Regardless of the solution proposed, at least some Supreme
Court justices have recognized potential problems created by the
collision of the third-party doctrine with advancing technology and
the ever-increasing prevalence of that technology in the lives of
Americans. Despite these difficulties, however, it would be unwise
to throw out the doctrine entirely.
III. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE IS PROBLEMATIC BUT
NECESSARY IN CYBERSPACE
Under a strict application of the third-party doctrine as it
currently exists, the search of the defendant’s Instagram account in
Gatson would have been constitutional without a search warrant.
an Internet-enabled phone could reveal an individual’s private interests or
concerns.”).
57
See id. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring) (“In light of these developments, it
would be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the 21st century were left
primarily to the federal courts using the blunt instrument of the Fourth
Amendment. Legislatures, elected by the people, are in a better position than we
are to assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those
that almost certainly will take place in the future.”).
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Even if the police had not obtained consent from the defendant for
the search, they could have—without showing probable cause—
obtained a court order requiring Instagram to grant access to
Gatson’s account and avoided any Fourth Amendment violations
because those pictures had been shared with Instagram itself,
which is a third party.58 This result is counter-factual with respect
to people’s actual reasonable privacy expectations.
A. Flaws in the Third-Party Doctrine as Applied to Cyberspace
The third-party doctrine is flawed because it does not reflect
reasonable privacy expectations in cyberspace. As discussed above,
the defendant’s data in Gatson would not have been entitled to
constitutional protection even if the defendant had not “consented”
to sharing his photos with the police. Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence in Jones questions the logic behind this and similar
applications of the third-party doctrine. 59 People do in fact have
reasonable expectations of privacy in information that is known to
others. The average American would probably be surprised if he
found out that when he sent an e-mail to his girlfriend or posted a
photograph to his Instagram account—access to which he had
deliberately restricted by allowing only people whom he had

58
The police would have to comply with current federal law protecting online
data, but those protections are less than would be provided by the Fourth
Amendment. Under current U.S. law, the government may access data stored for
more than 180 days if it can offer “specific and articulable facts showing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703. This is a lower
standard than the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard requires to justify
searches. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(objecting to the use of reasonable suspicion to justify cursory searches because
that standard does not provide as much protection from unreasonable searches
and seizures as does probable cause). Like any law, Congress can rescind these
protections at its whim. The experience of 9/11 has shown that Congress, when
frightened, can move remarkably quickly in restricting the liberties and privacy
rights of its citizens.
59
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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specifically approved to see his photos—that he had forfeited
reasonable expectations of privacy in that e-mail or that picture.60
The third-party doctrine is flawed also because it relies on
expectations of privacy, and those expectations may not be constant.
For example, in the wake of Edward Snowden’s revelations
regarding National Security Administration (“NSA”) surveillance
programs and the reporting of Glenn Greenwald in The Guardian,
Americans arguably no longer have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their online conduct because they have been warned that
the NSA is watching. 61 By this logic, any American government
that wants to infringe on privacy rights 62 has only to inform the
public that it no longer has any privacy in cyberspace, and the
public’s reasonable expectations will vanish along with its rights.63
60

See John Horrigan, Use of Cloud Computing Applications and Services,
PEW RESEARCH (Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.pewinternet.org/2008/09/12/useof-cloud-computing-applications-and-services/ (reporting on a poll finding that
90% of Internet users would be very concerned if their online files were sold to
other companies and over 60% would be either very concerned or somewhat
concerned if their files were given to law enforcement agencies upon request).
61
See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon
Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order?guni=Article:in%20body%
20link (reporting on a leaked secret order from the FISA court authorizing the
unlimited collection of call metadata from Verizon Wireless customers over a
three-month period); see also Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras & Ewen MacAskill,
Edward Snowden: US Surveillance ‘Not Something I’m Willing to Live Under’,
THE GUARDIAN (July 8, 2013, 2:22 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/jul/08/edward-snowden-surveillance-excess-interview (discussing the revelations
of Edward Snowden in an interview with Glenn Greenwald, which include the
existence of a program called “Boundless Informant”).
62
The motives behind such infringement need not be nefarious in order to be
dangerous:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom
are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
63
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(“More fundamentally, to make risk analysis dispositive in assessing the
reasonableness of privacy expectations would allow the government to define
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The Court’s response to this argument has been to suggest that
in such a circumstance, a “normative inquiry would be proper” to
ascertain reasonable privacy expectations.64 However, it is unclear
which fact patterns would trigger a normative inquiry. 65 Also
unclear is how such an inquiry would proceed and why privacy
expectations are not always evaluated using such an inquiry.66
The third-party doctrine is vulnerable to criticism for reasons
beyond its counter-factual premise. In the case of Instagram users,
if the doctrine accurately reflects privacy expectations, those
expectations are arbitrary and illogical. Suppose that Charles has a
collection of photographs that he has taken, and he has printed
them on glossy photography paper. If Charles keeps the photographs
in his desk drawer in his room, the police must obtain a search
warrant to search his desk and to view the pictures because the
pictures are in his home. Charles has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in items not revealed to the public but kept in his home.67
Even if Charles allows some of his family and friends to see his
pictures, the police would not be allowed to then break into his
home without a warrant to get a look at the photographs for
themselves.68 However, despite Charles’ efforts, a nosy member of
his family would be able to discover the pictures if that person
looked in his desk drawer.
the scope of Fourth Amendment protections. For example, law enforcement
officials, simply by announcing their intent to monitor the content of random
samples of first-class mail or private phone conversations, could put the public
on notice of the risks they would thereafter assume in such communications.”).
64
Id. at 740 n.5.
65
The Court held that such an inquiry would be triggered when an individual’s
subjective expectations had been shaped by “influences alien to well-recognized
Fourth Amendment freedoms.” Id. That reasoning simply begs the question
“which expectations are alien to the Fourth Amendment?,” which puts the
analysis right back where it started.
66
See Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The Court is willing
to concede only that, in some circumstances, a further ‘normative inquiry would
be proper.’ No meaningful effort is made to explain what those circumstances
might be, or why this case is not among them.”).
67
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
68
The police would be allowed to ask the friends or family members what
they had seen without first obtaining a warrant because the friends and family
are third parties.
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On the contrary, if Charles uploads his photos to Instagram
with the maximum privacy settings enabled rather than printing
and placing them in his desk drawer, he has now forfeited Fourth
Amendment protection of those pictures because the police can
view them without being required to obtain a warrant.69 In reality,
Charles has not relinquished his reasonable expectations of privacy
in his photographs. If anything, he has more reason to expect his
pictures will remain private when they are on Instagram than he
does if he has them in his desk. A nosy family member or friend
can access Charles’ pictures without his consent by opening his
desk drawer. However, viewing them on Instagram without
consent would require hacking into Charles’ account or correctly
guessing his password assuming he has his privacy settings
enabled.70 In this case, the justification of the third-party doctrine
and its purported reasonable expectations are either at odds with
Charles’ actual reasonable expectations of privacy, or Charles’
privacy expectations are arbitrarily derived.
These questionable results required by the application of the
third-party doctrine to cyberspace have caused some commentators
to call for the end of the third-party doctrine and consequently full
Fourth Amendment protection for data stored online. For many of
the reasons discussed above, Ryan Watzel argues that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Riley—and its supporting logic—is a signal
that the third-party doctrine does not have long to live.71

69

Statutes may also provide privacy protections. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
70
Instagram can view the pictures that Charles has posted, but Charles has a
legal agreement with them that those pictures will not be distributed to those
people he does not authorize. See Thank You, and We’re Listening, INSTAGRAM,
http://blog.instagram.com/post/38252135408/thank-you-and-were-listening (last
visited Jan. 24, 2015).
71
See Ryan Watzel, Riley’s Implications for Fourth Amendment Protection in
the Cloud, 124 YALE L.J. F. 73 (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/
forum/rileys-implications-in-the-cloud (“Riley suggests that the Court is ready to
find that cloud-based data receive Fourth Amendment protection, and that cloud
users do not waive a reasonable expectation of privacy in every file they save
simply because storage is moving to the cloud.”).
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B. The Necessity of the Third-Party Doctrine
Despite the issues with the third-party doctrine, there are good
reasons not to abandon it entirely because the doctrine is
functionally necessary and doctrinally defensible. The respected
computer law expert Professor Orin Kerr makes this argument in
his defense of the third-party doctrine. 72 Kerr offers a general
defense of the third-party doctrine, and this section examines and
modifies that defense specifically to cyberspace data storage. Kerr
defends the third-party doctrine on two fronts. First, despite its
logical inconsistencies, the doctrine provides clarity and
predictability to law enforcement. Second, the world is becoming
too dangerous with the advance of technology to eliminate the
third-party doctrine.
The third-party doctrine provides clarity and simplicity to the
law because it judges whether or not a Fourth Amendment search
has occurred based on the location of the item to be searched. 73
Kerr illustrates this point using a letter,74 but his example applies to
e-mail as well.75
If Harry sends an e-mail to Sally, Harry has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in that e-mail while it is in his possession
and while it is in transit to Sally.76 If an agent of the government
opens the e-mail before it arrives in Sally’s inbox, that examination
will be classified as a search, and the message will be subject to
Fourth Amendment protections. 77 Once the e-mail arrives in
Sally’s inbox, it becomes the property of Sally, and then Sally’s
privacy expectations govern the search rules regarding the
message.78 This is also true of every other e-mail in Sally’s inbox.79
72

Kerr, supra note 21.
See id. at 580.
74
Id. at 582.
75
See id. Note that there are important differences between e-mail and
traditional letters with respect to transmission that are not directly relevant to
this discussion.
76
Id.
77
Similarly, the police would not be permitted to board a mail truck and
conduct warrantless searches on every letter in the truck that had yet to be
delivered.
78
See Kerr, supra note 21, at 582.
73
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If the police were to gain Sally’s consent to search her computer
and discovered the e-mail from Harry, that e-mail message would
be searchable because Sally consented to the search, and the third-party
doctrine nullifies any privacy interest that Harry had in the e-mail
when he disclosed the contents to Sally, a third party.80
Examination of this scenario in the absence of the third-party
doctrine reveals the importance of the doctrine to efficient and
effective law enforcement. Harry sends an e-mail to Sally just as
before, and just as before, Sally consents to a police search of her
computer. The police discover the message from Harry, and they
open the e-mail and find pornographic images of children. With or
without the third-party doctrine, Sally is in a great deal of trouble
because she consented to the search. However, in the absence of
the third-party doctrine, Harry can now claim Fourth Amendment
protection for his e-mail and ask the court to exclude the e-mail
evidence because he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
communications with his friends, and the police search was
warrantless. Even though Sally consented to a search of her
computer, Harry did not consent to a search of his e-mail message.
The precise relationship between Harry and Sally would further
complicate the analysis. If Harry and Sally are close friends or
lovers, then Harry’s expectations of privacy in information
divulged to Sally are probably reasonable, and the evidence must
be excluded. However, if the two recently met or only have an
arms-length relationship, then perhaps Harry’s expectations are not
reasonable, and no warrant is needed. As can be seen from this
example, the exclusionary rule—the enforcement mechanism of
the Fourth Amendment—would require police conducting a search
of Sally’s computer to search only the files that had originated with
Sally at least until a full investigation of her relationship with
Harry could be conducted. 81 The consequences of any mistake

79

Id.
Id.
81
See Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that letters seized in
violation of the defendant’s Constitutional rights should have been returned to
him and not used as evidence against him at trial); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (incorporating the exclusionary rule to the states).
80
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would be the loss of potentially critical evidence of criminal
activity.82
According to Kerr, without the third-party doctrine, “information
should retain a history.”83 The police would need to determine the
history of every piece of information to be searched before
conducting the search in order to determine whose expectations of
privacy applied to each particular piece of information. Even after
making that determination, the work of figuring out whether or not
that person’s privacy expectations were reasonable would still be
left to do.
The pace of technological change creates an additional problem.
One of the most controversial third-party doctrine cases was the
pen register case, Smith v. Maryland.84 This case allowed the police
to obtain metadata85 about phone calls—specifically the numbers
called from a particular phone—without a warrant.86 People might
have considered the numbers that they were dialing to be a private
matter in the 1970s when the Supreme Court decided the case.87
However, in modern times, anyone a person calls who has a
mobile phone—or caller ID on a landline phone—knows from
which phone number the call is coming before he answers.88 This
advance in technology has changed the expectations of privacy that
people reasonably hold in phone numbers, especially given that
82

See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
Kerr, supra note 21, at 582.
84
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
85
Metadata is information regarding an item, such as a phone call or an
electronic file, that is about the item but does not deal directly with the content
of the item. Metadata about a phone call would include the number dialed, the
duration of the call, and the location from which the call was placed. For more
information about metadata, see Metadata, TECHTERMS.COM, http://www.
techterms.com/definition/metadata (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
86
See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46.
87
The dissenting justices certainly did. Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(“Most private telephone subscribers may have their own numbers listed in a
publicly distributed directory, but I doubt there are any who would be happy to
have broadcast to the world a list of the local or long distance numbers they
have called.”).
88
The exception would be numbers that are deliberately blocked from
identification programs and generally appear as “unknown.”
83
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telemarketers are constantly calling people who have never
divulged their phone number to the entities making those calls.89
Now the courts not only must define privacy expectations for
various technologies,90 but they must also re-evaluate those decisions
every decade or so to determine whether or not reasonable expectations
have changed.
The third-party doctrine avoids all of these decisions and
complications because a third party is a third party no matter which
technology a suspect uses to transmit information to that entity.
Some scholars have suggested that one way to cure the ambiguity
inherent in a unilateral repeal of the third-party doctrine would be
to simply require a warrant obtained after a showing of probable
cause for nearly every search that occurs in cyberspace per the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause.91 The weakness of this approach
is that the technology available to criminals to carry out and
conceal their crimes is now more sophisticated, and the potential
consequences of those crimes are much greater than they were
when the Fourth Amendment was ratified in the 18th century.
Modern criminals are capable of much more damaging
activities than a bank robbery or even a series of murders.92 They
89

Americans must submit their phone numbers to a list to get telemarketers to
leave them alone. See National Do Not Call Registry, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.donotcall.gov/confirm/conf.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2015) (providing
a means to verify if you have properly registered your phone number for the do
not call list, which in theory prevents telemarketers from making unsolicited
calls to that number).
90
Examples of such technology include e-mail, cloud storage, cybershopping
purchasing history, browsing history, financial transactions using online services
such as PayPal, etc.
91
See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1302–03 (2004) (arguing that standards, such as mere
reasonableness, justifying searches that are lower than the probable cause
threshold have been inadequate protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures).
92
See Andrew Roman, September 11, 2001—As It Happened—The South Tower
Attack, YOUTUBE (Aug. 30, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1lKZqqSI9-s
(showing a series of newscasts at the time of the attack on Tower 2 of the World
Trade Center); see also Nerve Gas Attack on Tokyo Subway, HISTORY, http://
www.history.com/this-day-in-history/nerve-gas-attack-on-tokyo-subway (last visited
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engage in sophisticated organized crime.93 In order to implement
their designs, they use technology that is much more effective and
difficult to combat than were single-shot muskets and couriers on
horseback.94 Privacy and security are on opposite ends of a sliding
scale, and the following example illustrates that a total
abandonment of the third-party doctrine might tip the balance too
far in one direction and expose the fact that there is such a thing as
too much privacy.
Suppose Sven is using Instagram95 to run a criminal syndicate
that specializes in contract killings. His syndicate has a
privacy-protected Instagram account and gives access only to
prospective contractors and clients. When a client wants a job done,
Sven posts a picture of the target on the syndicate’s account. He
then sends a text message96 to one of his contractors with a code
indicating which picture is the target and a password to the
Instagram account. After the contractor completes the job, Sven
deletes the picture. He might also deactivate the account as an
extra precaution. In this scenario, the police are entirely reliant on
the cooperation of Instagram to conduct an investigation because a
magistrate is highly unlikely to find that the government has
probable cause to search the account without any voluntary
cooperation on the part of Sven’s associates. Police might have
confidence that Sven is a criminal mastermind and have
corresponding suspicions of his involvement with professional
killings, but such a general suspicion is insufficient to obtain a
Feb. 13, 2015) (describing the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system in
1995 by members of the religious cult, Aum Shinrikyo).
93
See Chris Matthews, Fortune 5: The Biggest Organized Crime Groups in the
World, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/09/14/biggestorganized-crime-groups-in-the-world/ (detailing the five largest organized criminal
operations in the world).
94
See Robert Lemos, Report: Cybercrime Costs US $12.7M a Year, ARS
TECHNICA (Oct. 17, 2014, 11:05 AM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/
10/report-cybercrime-costs-us-12-7m-a-year/ (reporting on the costs, primarily
to energy and financial companies, of cybercrime attacks).
95
An analogous example can be created with any data storage platform
(Facebook, Dropbox, Google Drive, etc.).
96
Text messages are conveyed through third parties such as telecommunications
companies.
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warrant. By conducting operations exclusively through third
parties in which Sven has a reasonable expectation of privacy—
perhaps all syndicate members swore a blood oath to remain
loyal—he can conduct his business with near-impunity. 97 The
consequences are even graver in the example of terrorist activities.
For these reasons, the third-party doctrine is probably necessary for
the safety of modern society.98
IV. BALANCING THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE WITH
REASONABLE PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS IN CYBERSPACE
While the third-party doctrine has problems as it relates to the
actual privacy expectations of Americans in their daily lives, there
are good reasons to believe that eliminating the doctrine entirely
would make law enforcement in the modern world increasingly
difficult or almost impossible in some cases. Therefore, there must
be a compromise, as always, between security and privacy. In
cyberspace, this compromise would be best made on a
97
It is likely that Instagram, and other platforms that rely on public relations
to make millions of dollars a year, would not long allow Sven’s activities to go
on and would cooperate voluntarily with law enforcement. Google currently
does so with respect to child pornography detected in Gmail. See Hayley
Tsukayama, How Closely is Google Really Reading Your E-mail?, WASH POST
(Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/08/04/
how-closely-is-google-really-reading-your-e-mail/.
98
There is a movement in the wake of Edward Snowden’s NSA spying
revelations to increasingly use encrypted programs to transmit data. See David
Kravets, Citing Encryption, FBI Lobbying To Keep Phone Metadata Spying
Powers, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 25, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2015/02/citing-encryption-fbi-lobbying-to-keep-phone-metadata-spying-powers/
(discussing efforts by the FBI and some lawmakers to maintain section 215 of
the Patriot Act that allows warrantless bulk metadata collection between
overseas and domestic callers in order to compensate for the increasing use of
encryption in communications). There are also services—like Mark Cuban’s
Cyber Dust—that never store customer data on any server in addition to using
data encryption to protect messages in transit. CYBER DUST, https://www.
cyberdust.com/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2015). These technologies and services
may make the third-party doctrine a nullity in cyberspace because even if the
government can compel a third party to give up information on a user without
probable cause or a warrant, if the third party either does not have any
information or cannot access the information because it is encrypted, warrants
are immaterial.
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platform-by-platform basis. Currently, the law treats as the same
Dropbox, Google Drive, Instagram, Facebook, and all other
cyberspace locations because they are third parties with which
users have consented to share information. Therefore, users have
waived their reasonable expectations of privacy in data stored with
those services. In order to balance the necessity of the third-party
doctrine in some contexts with people’s actual reasonable privacy
expectations, the doctrine should be maintained and modified for
some cyberspace platforms but eliminated with respect to others.
Services that store data in cyberspace should be divided into
two categories.99 The first category is sites whose primary purpose
is data storage and that involve little or no social interaction or
sharing of content between users. Examples in this category
include Dropbox, SpiderOak, and Google Drive. 100 The second
category is services whose primary purpose is to share information
with others. Examples in this category include Instagram, Twitter,
and Facebook. The third-party doctrine should remain fully
applicable to the first category of services because users rarely, if
ever, share information on those services with strangers, and
therefore, eliminating the third-party doctrine would make criminal
investigations involving these services difficult, if not impossible,
to conduct. However, the third-party doctrine should no longer
apply to services in the second category because law enforcement
already has opportunities to gain information without a warrant—
as it did in Gatson—and therefore a more accurate reflection of the
reasonable privacy expectations of citizens using those services
would not unduly jeopardize effective law enforcement. In the
99

This division is based on the premise that intellectual consistency is less
important in this area than is striking a pragmatic balance between the interests
of privacy and effective law enforcement. Based on the concurrence of Justice
Sotomayor in Jones, it can be well argued that the third-party doctrine should
not apply in cyberspace anymore, particularly in the case of pure data storage
services like Dropbox. Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence is discussed in greater
detail Part II (B) supra.
100
In each of these examples, there is some sharing possible, but that is not
the primary purpose of the services. Many people use their Google Drive
accounts to store information without sharing that information with anyone. On
the contrary, relatively few people use Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter without
sharing information.
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absence of the third-party doctrine, the government could no
longer compel a service such as Facebook to allow access to a
user’s account without courts classifying such access as a search
under the Fourth Amendment and requiring a warrant supported by
probable cause. With respect to this second category, courts should
evaluate the reasonable privacy expectations of users of a
particular service using the service’s TOS agreement in order to
judge whether or not police have conducted a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes.
A. An Evidentiary Privilege Between Users and Service Providers
The privacy expectations of users of services like Dropbox that
customers primarily use for data storage should not be entirely
disregarded. The more difficult the task is for the government to
obtain information, the more reasonable the privacy expectations
of the users become. Therefore, a paradox of the third-party
doctrine is that the more reasonable the privacy expectations of
users are the more dangerous is full acknowledgement of those
expectations. Holding the third-party doctrine inapplicable to such
services would make criminal investigations too difficult.101 As a
compromise, the courts should create an evidentiary privilege
between users and cyberspace data storage services like Dropbox
whose primary function is data storage. Jacob Small has described
such a privilege in detail.102 The privilege would protect information
so long as:
(1) a sufficient level of privacy has been maintained, (2) the
documents have not been shared with a party outside of the
privileged relationship, (3) the contract establishing the
relationship is consistent with a subjective expectation that the
documents will be private, and (4) the user, not the provider, is
asserting the privilege.103

101

These difficulties are discussed in Part III (B) supra.
See Jacob M. Small, Storing Documents in the Cloud: Toward an Evidentiary
Privilege Protecting Papers and Effects Stored on the Internet, 23 GEO. MASON
U. C. R. L.J. 255, 267 (2013).
103
Id. at 279.
102
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However, in order to allow law enforcement to continue functioning
effectively in cyberspace, there should be an exception to the
privilege for information that is evidence of criminal activity.
If the police have suspicion falling short of the probable cause
required to get a Fourth Amendment warrant that a specific user’s
account contains evidence of specific criminal conduct, they would
be able to ask the service if the user’s account contains such
evidence. If it does, the police would be able to obtain a warrant
based on that affirmation, and the privilege would be void. If not,
the service would answer the inquiry in the negative, and the
search would end without revealing any of the user’s data to
anyone who did not already have access to it. 104 This proposed
evidentiary privilege thus would prevent the government from
conducting dragnet searches of user accounts without any
particularized showing of cause or suspicion but would not allow
users to hide evidence of suspected criminal activity with impunity.
B. Violations of Terms of Service Should Require a Warrant
With respect to services that are social in nature, the Supreme
Court should determine that the Fourth Amendment is activated if
the government wants to obtain information through means that
would constitute a breach of a particular website’s TOS if a
non-government actor employed the same means.105 In those cases,
104
There are sites that explicitly promise not to cooperate with law enforcement
and indeed prevent themselves from being able to cooperate with law
enforcement by encrypting users’ data without storing the users’ passwords.
Therefore, if the police ask for access to a user’s account, the service literally is
unable to comply. See SPIDEROAK, Law Enforcement, https://spideroak.com/
law_enforcement/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (explaining that the only data that
SpiderOak has access to is metadata regarding the creation of a user’s account).
105
This “non-government user” qualification is important so that services do
not accommodate government intrusion into their Terms of Service. It is true
that if a site writes warrantless searches into its Terms of Service, users could
take their business elsewhere. However, some services, such as Facebook, have
such market power and leverage that the consumer is not in a good bargaining
position because there are no close substitutes for Facebook. Facebook is a
comprehensive service whereas services like Instagram and Twitter specialize in
sharing pictures or brief thoughts respectively. Facebook is larger than any other
social network by a wide margin, and even Google has failed to adequately
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the government should have to obtain a warrant supported by
probable cause before conducting the search. Furthermore, the
government should be prohibited from conducting warrantless
searches in which it assumes the identity of a person known to the
target user regardless of whether or not such conduct is permitted
by the TOS. To not do so would make a mockery of the notion of
consent and potentially create an Orwellian nightmare.106
Under this TOS test, if the government violates a cyberspace
service’s TOS as they would be applied to the average user, then
the government must obtain a search warrant supported by
probable cause pursuant to the Fourth Amendment in order to
conduct the search.107 This standard serves two important purposes.
First, it is clear. All of the cyberspace services discussed in this
article have TOS agreements that define the norms of acceptable
conduct while using the service, and when these terms are changed,
services generally notify all users. Courts will have an easy task of
deciding whether or not a given government action constituted a
Fourth Amendment search because simply reading the
contemporaneous TOS will resolve the inquiry.
compete with it. See Steve Faktor, What Killed Google+ And What Can Save It,
Forbes (May 1, 2014, 1:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevefaktor/2014/
05/01/what-killed-google-and-what-will-save-it/3/ (explaining why Google+ failed
to become a successful rival to Facebook).
106
We might already be there. Smart TVs made by Samsung have the ability
to record conversation and transmit that data to a third-party where it is stored
for an unknown period of time. This data, divulged with warning to consumers
via a privacy agreement, would likely not be subject to Fourth Amendment
protection under the third-party doctrine. Therefore, anyone purchasing a smart
TV with this capability is basically placing a government listening device in his
home. See Not in Front of the Telly: Warning Over ‘Listening’ TV, BBC (Feb. 9,
2015, 6:20 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31296188.
107
It is possible that violating a website’s TOS could be illegal under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”). See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness
Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1583
(2010) (noting that although the court in United States v. Drew did not find a
TOS violation to be illegal under the CFAA because such a ruling would have
clearly given the CFAA an unconstitutionally broad sweep, “the basic strategy
in Drew can be repeated in other cases that are less clear. . . . The courts now
must use vagueness arguments to chisel away at the edifice of the CFAA until
the resulting scope of the statute is both relatively clear and relatively narrow.”).
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The second purpose is that such a rule would truly reflect the
reasonable privacy expectations of users. A user can reasonably
expect other users to follow the TOS of the site he or she is using
because those terms are enforced by negative incentives. Although
many users do not diligently read the TOS of each website with
which they engage, they do generally follow them. For example,
Facebook famously has a policy preventing the use of a false
identity.108 To comply with Facebook’s TOS, users must use their
real legal names. Some users do not, but the vast majority of users
do. 109 Other services, such as Twitter and Google+, do not have
such a requirement, and as a result, many more anonymous
accounts are on those sites than on Facebook. Posting nude photos
on Facebook or Instagram is impermissible,110 but Twitter allows
those pictures. Consequently, many pornography-related accounts
are on Twitter with far less, if any, on Facebook. Therefore, if
making an account with a name that does not match the legal name
108

Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
legal/terms (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (“Facebook users provide their real names
and information, and we need your help to keep it that way.”). Apparently some
users do not wish to be helpful. See Eric Ravenscraft, How to Use a Fake Name
on Facebook Without Getting Flagged, LIFEHACKER (Sept. 22, 2014, 10:00 AM),
http://lifehacker.com/how-to-use-a-fake-name-on-facebook-without-getting-flag1637644101 (explaining how Facebook users can use a fake name without detection
and subsequent account suspension).
109
Facebook is diligent about enforcing this policy but is also willing to make
accommodation in certain circumstances. See Reed Albergotti, Facebook
Changes Real-Name Policy After Uproar From Drag Queens, THE WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 2, 2014, 3:31 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-changes-realname-policy-after-uproar-from-drag-queens-1412223040 (reporting that Facebook
will allow drag queens to use their stage names on their Facebook pages after
several drag queens protested the suspension of their accounts for violating
Facebooks policy requiring users to use their real names on for their profiles).
But see Steve Dent, Native Americans Still Battling Facebook Over ‘Real Name’
Policy, ENGADGET (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/02/17/facebooknative-american-real-names/ (telling the story of American Indians trying
unsuccessfully to use their tribal names instead of their legal names for their
Facebook accounts).
110
For Facebook’s terms, see FACEBOOK, supra note 108. For Instagram’s
terms, see Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com/478745558852511
(last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (“You may not post . . . pornographic or sexually
suggestive photos or other content via the Service.”).
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of the account’s creator is a TOS violation, then a user can
reasonably expect that he is actually interacting with the person
with whom he thinks he is interacting. Under those circumstances,
the government could still create false accounts in the hopes of
tricking suspects into divulging information to it, but it would have
to obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause to do so.
On the other hand, if the TOS allow for such false accounts, then
the users of that site are on notice of that fact and do not have the
same reasonable privacy expectations. Accordingly, the government
could use false accounts on that particular site without obtaining
warrants. The application of the TOS test will vary depending on
the terms of each particular service.
In the case of Instagram, the Fourth Amendment should protect
user data, such as that of Daniel Gatson, when the user has chosen
to make his account “private” and require specific consent for
another user to be able to view his pictures. If the pictures are
publicly available, then police can view them like anyone else
without violating reasonable privacy expectations. Users must take
affirmative steps to ensure their photos are not viewable by the
public, and this action evidences a reasonable expectation of
privacy.111 Unfortunately for Gatson, the TOS test would not have
helped him because he consented to revealing his information to an
account that the police happened to operate. Arguably, Gatson
consented to revealing his photos to another account generally but
would not have done so had he known that the police operated the
account. The argument that his consent was nullified by the
deception has been made before and rejected by the Court.112
In addition to precedential obligations, a finding that the use of
informants or undercover police agents constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search would cripple the government’s ability to
111
Controlling Your Visibility, INSTAGRAM , https://help.instagram.com/
116024195217477/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2015) (explaining the procedure for
making an Instagram account private).
112
See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (rejecting the
argument that a defendant’s consent is vitiated when he believes he is speaking
to someone who is not an agent of the government but is, in fact, an agent of the
government).
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investigate and prosecute organized crime. 113 Even without the
third-party doctrine, the result in Gatson would stand under the
TOS test. Any user could have created an account under a false
name to gain access to Gatson’s photos without violating
Instagram’s TOS. Therefore, when the police did so, they did not
infringe on Gatson’s reasonable privacy expectations. The police
conducted no search, and consequently no warrant was needed.
However, the result would have been different had Gatson chosen
to post his incriminating photos on Facebook.
Under the TOS test, Daniel Gatson would have had greater
reasonable expectations of privacy on Facebook than he had on
Instagram because the TOS of Facebook do not permit users to
create accounts with names other than their own. 114 If police
created a Facebook account using a name other than that of the
officers creating the account, they would be in violation of
Facebook’s TOS and would need a Fourth Amendment warrant to
conduct that search.
Instagram, Google+, Twitter, and other similar services allow
their users to create anonymous profiles and accounts. As a result,
as in Gatson, the police could trick a defendant into revealing
information by using an account with a false name. This result is
proper in light of the precedent set by the Court in cases involving
undercover agents and informants and because people do not
reasonably expect that strangers are never affiliated with law
enforcement.115 A requirement that law enforcement officers always
See id. at 315 (Warren, J., dissenting) (“There are some situations where
the law could not adequately be enforced without the employment of some guile
or misrepresentation of identity. A law enforcement officer performing his
official duties cannot be required always to be in uniform or to wear his badge
of authority on the lapel of his civilian clothing. Nor need he be required in all
situations to proclaim himself an arm of the law. It blinks the realities of
sophisticated, modern-day criminal activity and legitimate law enforcement
practices to argue the contrary.”).
114
See FACEBOOK, supra note 108. The exception to this might be if the
police were a drag queen police force. See Albergotti, supra note 109 and
accompanying text.
115
See, e.g., Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 293 (rejecting the argument that a defendant’s
consent is vitiated when he believes he is speaking to someone who is not an
agent of the government but is, in fact, an agent of the government).
113
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reveal their identity in the absence of a warrant would cripple their
investigative effectiveness. However, allowing the police to
impersonate specific real people that are known to their targets is
an entirely different matter.
C. Government Impersonation of Actual Persons
The courts should draw a line between the police creating an
undercover account based on a fictitious personality and the police
creating an undercover account impersonating someone who exists
and is known to the targeted user. If the police are allowed to
impersonate the acquaintances, friends, and family members of
investigative targets for the purposes of tricking potential
defendants into consenting to searches and forfeiting their privacy
rights, then fears of a totalitarian chilling effect on free expression
as Justice Douglas expressed in his White dissent could come to
fruition:
[M]ust everyone live in fear that every word he speaks may be
transmitted or recorded and later repeated to the entire world?
I can imagine nothing that has a more chilling effect on people
speaking their minds and expressing their views on important
matters. The advocates of that regime should spend some time
in totalitarian countries and learn firsthand the kind of regime
they are creating here.116

Such a ruling would also make a mockery of the notion of
consent. It is one thing to tell a secret to a trusted friend who
subsequently reveals the information to the police or to grant
access to a strange Instagram account knowing full well that you
are disclosing information to a stranger. Those risks are inherent in
interactions with other people, as the Court has held on many
occasions.117 It is another thing entirely to believe you are telling
your mother something when you are actually conversing with a
government agent. To say that a person who thinks he is speaking
with his mother due to deception—not his own negligence—
116

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 764–65 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 413 (“Neither this Court nor any member of it has
ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing
will not reveal it.”).
117
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consented to tell an impersonator information meant for his mother is
unreasonable.118 A finding that such deception does not constitute a
search would require anyone who wanted to keep his affairs
private from the government to create an elaborate system of
identity checks to feel truly safe in the confidences he wishes
others to keep. People reasonably expect that they do not live in a
country where those measures are necessary.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on this tactic,
the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) has already tried
it.119 The DEA arrested Sondra Prince because they suspected that
she was involved in a conspiracy to distribute drugs.120 During her
arrest, the DEA seized pictures from her phone. Later, an agent
used those pictures to create a fake Facebook profile. 121 The
agent—through the fake profile—subsequently “friended” at least
eleven people during an investigation into a New York drug ring.122
During the course of the investigation, the agent posted messages
from the account such as, “I miss Hovie,” Prince’s suspected
118
In analogous circumstances pertaining to rape, many courts have unfortunately
disagreed. See, e.g., Suliveres v. Commonwealth, 449 Mass. 112, 118 (2007)
(finding defendant not guilty of rape when he impersonated the accuser’s boyfriend
in order to have sex with her because “[f]raudulently obtaining consent to sexual
intercourse does not constitute rape.”). However, some states have passed
statutes to arrive at a more just outcome in cases where rapists impersonate a
victim’s lover in order to engage in sexual intercourse with him or her. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 261(a) (2013) (listing as a circumstance constituting rape:
“[w]here a person submits under the belief that the person committing the act is
someone known to the victim other than the accused, and this belief is induced
by any artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced by the accused, with intent to
induce the belief.”); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503 (2014) (listing as a
circumstance constituting rape: “[t]he sexual penetration is accomplished by
fraud.”).
119
See Terrence McCoy, DEA Created a Fake Facebook Profile in This
Woman’s Name Using Seized Pics – Then Impersonated Her, WASH. POST (Oct.
7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/10/
07/dea-created-a-fake-facebook-profile-in-this-womans-name-using-seized-picsthen-impersonated-her/ (telling the story of Sondra Prince (aka Sanda Arquiett),
whom the DEA impersonated on Facebook in order to get information from her
family and friends).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
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boyfriend. 123 Prince eventually discovered the false account and
sued the DEA.124 The lawsuit settled in 2015 for $134,000, but the
DEA admitted no wrongdoing. 125 Even if the DEA had obtained
Prince’s pictures through legitimate means, and impersonating
other people was not against Facebook’s TOS, the Fourth
Amendment should protect citizens from such tactics.126 The harm
of allowing the government to impersonate an actual person known
to the suspect is also apparent—and perhaps more chilling to the
average law-abiding citizen—in an example outside the context of
a specific criminal investigation.
The practice of two strangers meeting for the first time and
then “friending” each other on Facebook afterwards has become
common. Suppose that Ricardo has been saying and posting things
online that are critical of the current U.S. government. Government
agents begin to track Ricardo’s social habits and in the process
discover that he has recently joined the Oily Wrapper Cigar
Club. 127 The agents discover that a man named Jimmy is also a
member of the club, and playing the hunch that Ricardo and Jimmy
have recently met, the agents make a Facebook profile for Jimmy
and send a friend request to Ricardo. Ricardo, reasonably
expecting that the friend request really comes from Jimmy, accepts
it. In one sense, Ricardo has now consented to sharing any
personal information on his Facebook with the police.128 However,
123

Id.
Id.
125
See Lisa Vaas, Fake Facebook Account Case Settled With DEA Who
Admits No Wrongdoing, NAKED SECURITY (Jan. 23, 2015), https://nakedsecurity.
sophos.com/2015/01/23/fake-facebook-account-case-settled-with-dea-who-admitsno-wrongdoing/.
126
Facebook has complained to the DEA about this behavior and demanded
that they stop because impersonating people on Facebook violates their TOS for
everyone, including the government. See Facebook Tells DEA: Stop Impersonating
Users, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/2014/10/20/technology/security/
facebook-dea/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2015).
127
To my knowledge such a place does not exist, and if it does, my use of its
name is purely coincidental.
128
This sense is the same dubious sense that a woman who has sex with a
stranger who she believes to be her husband has consented to sex with that
stranger and is not being raped.
124
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Ricardo believes he is sharing that information with a new
friend.129 This conduct differs from that of a person who thinks he
is sharing information with one stranger, but the recipient turns out
to be a different stranger. If police could permissibly impersonate
the close friends and family members of their targets, society
would feel much less open and free.
The TOS test and categorical ban on warrantless impersonation
of specific, actual people will allow users of cyberspace data
sharing services some measure of reasonable Fourth Amendment
protections but will not unduly hinder the effective investigation of
crime.
V. CONCLUSION
Instagram, Facebook, Dropbox, and other third-party data
storage services are becoming more important to Americans in
their daily lives with each passing year. The Fourth Amendment
should protect the reasonable privacy expectations of users of these
services because diminishing the privacy rights of citizens simply
because the means of communication and information storage are
changing is arbitrary and illogical.
In the case of services like Dropbox and Google Drive—whose
primary function is to store data for users with minimal or nonexistent sharing functionality—the third-party doctrine should
remain in full effect. To do otherwise would greatly endanger the
public and unreasonably hinder law enforcement. However, there
are few places where a person’s actual privacy expectations are more
reasonable than in information stored in a password-protected
Dropbox account. Therefore, an evidentiary privilege is needed to
ensure that law enforcement has access only to evidence of
criminal activity and nothing else unless it has been granted a
search warrant under the Fourth Amendment.
With respect to cyberspace data stored with services like
Instagram and Facebook—whose primary purpose is the sharing of
129

In order to avoid this mistake in the future, Ricardo will need to get in the
habit of giving people he meets for the first time a piece of personal information
that he can later ask them about to confirm their identities.
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data—people can reasonably expect that other users adhere to the
TOS. Therefore, users can reasonably expect that the government
will follow the same rules. If the government does not, its efforts
should be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment, and a
warrant obtained upon a showing of probable cause should be
required. Under any circumstances, when the police impersonate
an actual person known to a target with the design to obtain
information from that target, that conduct should be permissible
only with a valid search warrant obtained by showing probable
cause under the Fourth Amendment. Adopting these changes will
allow the third-party doctrine—which is probably necessary to
effectively prosecute crime in the 21st century—to adequately
protect modern reasonable privacy expectations without unduly
sacrificing the public good achieved through effective law
enforcement.

